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From a historical perspective, the formation and evolution of 
administrative law in many countries and regions have relied upon 
the important role and contribution of the judiciary.  China is no 
exception in this respect.  Over the past roughly thirty years, since 
the promulgation of the Administrative Litigation Law in 1989, 
Chinese courts have worked hard to secure the compliance of 
administrative actions with laws and regulations, and have acted as 
disguised lawmakers in fashioning new norms in regulating 
administrative agencies.  
The development of administrative law in China has also been 
propelled by legislation.  The National People’s Congress (NPC) 
and its Standing Committee have promulgated several laws 
regulating particular types of administrative action, such as 
administrative punishment, administrative licensing, and 
administrative compulsion, among others.  Moreover, the NPC has 
passed many laws regulating specific areas of public administration, 
including but not limited to environmental protection, land 
administration, taxation, insurance, banking, and securities.  In 
addition to making laws to regulate public administration, the 
legislature also monitors agencies’ statutory compliance through its 
“law enforcement inspection” power.1 
                                               
 * Professor, Peking University School of Law.  I am very grateful to 
Neysun Mahboubi for his kind and helpful comments and edits on an earlier draft.  
I also am indebted to the comments from the participants of the 9th 
Administrative Law Discussion Forum at the Institutum Iurisprudentiae, 
Academia Sinica in Taipei on June 10-11, 2014, as well as the participants of the 
roundtable discussion centered on this special issue of the University of 
Pennsylvania Asia Law Review held at Peking University Law School in Beijing 
on June 21, 2014. 
1 See Lin Yan & Jacques deLisle, The NPC Standing Committee’s Law 
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Presently, in China, however, the legislature and judiciary are 
inherently limited as external checking mechanisms. It is 
insufficient to rely on them alone to fully advance Chinese 
administrative law.  Meanwhile, especially since the late 1990’s, 
“self-regulation” or internal control within Chinese administration 
itself has come to play an important role which ought to be 
highlighted.2  This paper will delineate such “administrative self-
regulation” in China through the examples of rulemaking 
procedures, “filing and check” of normative documents, and criteria 
for the exercise of administrative discretion.3 
Why would the Chinese administration be incentivized to 
pursue “self-regulation,” given its dominant position in the political 
structure?  This paper will argue that administrative self-regulation 
is driven by a variety of dynamics that include pressures for 
democratic legitimacy, as well as the demands of the bureaucratic 
structure.  
However, the drivers for administrative self-regulation are 
limited in terms of their strength and effectiveness.  Therefore, 
while self-regulation is an important phenomenon and cannot be 
ignored, the rule of administrative law in China cannot ultimately 
depend upon it.  Without future political and judicial reforms 
enhancing the positions of the legislature and the judiciary in the 
public power structure, it is doubtful that administrative self-
regulation can avoid administrative tyranny and truly ensure that 
administration is subordinate to the rule of law. 
 
I. EXTERNAL REGULATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 
AND ITS LIMITS 
                                                                                                           
Enforcement Inspection Power: Brief History, Process and Main Functions, U. 
PA. ASIA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
2 Id. 
 3 The term “administrative self-regulation” (xingzheng zizhi or xingzheng 
ziwo guizhi) in this paper refers to hierarchical supervision from within the 
administrative regime, as contrasted with “external” supervision by the legislature 
or judiciary. 
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A. The Role of the Legislature 
 
Since judicial review of administrative action was fully 
established in China by the promulgation of the Administrative 
Litigation Law in 1989,4 there have been a number of significant 
developments in the area of administrative law, including legislative 
enactment of laws on state compensation, administrative 
reconsideration, and administrative supervision,5 as well as laws on 
administrative penalties, administrative licensing, compulsory 
enforcement, and rulemaking.6  Many basic laws in specific areas of 
                                               
 4 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (中华人民共和
国行政诉讼法) [Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990) (China).  Actually, it was the 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa (Shixing) (中华人民共和国民
事诉讼法(试行)) [Civil Procedure Law (interim)] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 8, 1982, expired in 1991) that first introduced 
judicial review of administrative action in civil procedure.  However, on the basis 
of that law alone, the justifiability of administrative action was not generally 
confirmed, but rather depended upon specific authorizations in particular statutes. 
 5 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (中华人民共和国
行政复议法) [Law on Administrative Reconsideration] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999, 
amended Aug. 27, 2009); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Jiancha Fa 
(中华人民共和国行政监察法) [Law on Administrative Supervision] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 9, 1997, 
effective May 9, 1997, amended June 25, 2010); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Guojia Peichang Fa (中华人民共和国国家赔偿法) [State Compensation Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May 12, 1994, 
effective Jan. 1, 1995, amended Apr. 29, 2010 & Oct. 26, 2012). 
 6 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Qiangzhi Fa (中华人民共和
国行政强制法) [Law on Compulsory Enforcement] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30, 2011, effective Jan. 1, 2012); 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Xuke Fa (中华人民共和囯行政许可
法) [Law on Administrative Licensing] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 27, 2003, effective July 1, 2004); Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Lifa Fa (中华人民共和国立法法) [Law on Legislation] 
(promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000, 
amended Mar. 15, 2015; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa (中
华人民共和国行政处罚法) [Law on Administrative Penalties] (promulgated by 
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 17, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996, amended Aug. 27, 
2009). 
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public administration, including environmental protection, land 
administration, tax collection, insurance, banking, and securities 
have also been promulgated.7  All of these law-makings have been 
produced by the NPC and its Standing Committee, and have 
established a general framework for regulating administrative 
agencies.  Through these means, public administration has been 
constituted, limited, proceduralized, and made accountable. 
Of course, most of this legislation (with the notable exception 
of the Administrative Litigation Law)8 was initially drafted by 
government departments or the Legislative Affairs Office of the 
State Council.9  Inevitably, many administrative priorities were 
                                               
 7 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yinhangye Jiandu Guanli Fa (中华人民
共和国银行业监督管理法) [Banking Supervision Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2003, effective Feb. 1, 2004, 
amended Oct. 31, 2006); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa (中华人
民共和国证券法) [Securities Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, effective Jul. 1, 1999, amended Aug. 28, 2004, 
Oct. 27, 2005, Jun. 29, 2013, and Aug. 31, 2014); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Baoxian Fa (中华人民共和国保险法) [Insurance Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995, 
amended Dec. 28, 2002, Feb. 28, 2009, and Aug. 31, 2014); Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Shuishou Zhengshou Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国税收征收管理法) 
[Tax Collection Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Sep. 4, 1992, effective Jan. 1, 1993, amended Feb. 28, 1995, Apr. 28, 2001, Jun. 
29, 2013, and Apr. 24, 2015); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohu Fa 
(中华人民共和国环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 
1989, amended Apr. 24, 2014); Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli Fa (中
华人民共和国土地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 25, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, 
amended Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998, and Aug. 28, 2004). 
 8The Administrative Litigation Law was initially drafted by the 
“Administrative Law Research Group,” comprised mostly of legal scholars, 
which was delegated this task by the NPC Standing Committee’s Legal Affairs 
Working Commission.  Neysun A. Mahboubi, Participation and Accountability in 
Chinese Administrative Procedure (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
 9 Legislative affairs offices, at each level of government at or above the 
county level, are charged with overall planning and coordination of rulemaking by 
the government, ex ante review of draft rules, “filing and check” as well as post 
hoc review of promulgated rules, providing legal advice for major decision-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5
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planted therein.10  Even so, these laws were examined by and issued 
in the name of the national legislature, and reflect legislative will, 
external to the administrative regime, as to the regulation of public 
administration.  Over time, it has become increasingly common for 
agencies to solicit NPC opinions while preparing initial legislative 
drafts11—or even for the NPC Standing Committee’s Legal Affairs 
Working Commission or the NPC Special Committees themselves 
to take over initial drafting.12  Further, there have been a growing 
                                                                                                           
making (zhongda juece) by the government, undertaking administrative 
reconsideration procedures, and handling administrative litigation cases, among 
other responsibilities. 
 10  In China, this phenomenon is usually referenced as “departmentalist 
legislation” (bumen lifa).  Infra note 18. 
 11  As a scholar who is frequently called upon in this respect, I have 
personally witnessed the trend, in which it is increasingly common for agencies 
charged with preparing legislative drafts to invite experts from both the national 
and local people’s congresses, as well as experts from academia and practice, to 
participate in roundtable discussions on the contents of their drafts.  One of the 
reasons for this may be that such ex ante dialogues are presumed to help the 
agency’s positions or priorities in the later legislative process. 
 12  It is rare, in China, for the NPC’s subordinate institutions to make the 
initial draft of legislation.  However, there are a few examples.  See, e.g. 
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民
共和国劳动争议调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec., 29, 2007, 
effective May 1, 2008) was drafted by the NPC Standing Committee’s Legal 
Affairs Working Commission; Wang Wenzhen & Zhang Shicheng (王文珍&张世
诚), Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa de Xintupo (《劳动争议调解仲裁
法》的新突破) [New Breakthrough of the Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law], 56 ZHONGGUO LAODONG [CHINA LAB.] 6, 6–10 (2008); the 
amendment of Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Huanjing Baohufa (中华人民共和
国环境保护法) [Environmental Protection Law] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 26, 1989, effective Dec. 26, 1989, amended 
Apr. 24, 2014) was launched by Quanguo Renda Huanjing yu Ziyuan Baohu 
Weiyuanhui (全国人民代表大会环境与资源保护委员会) [NPC Environmental 
and Resources Protection Committee]; Ou Changmei (欧昌梅), Huanbaofa Ying 
Xieqingchu Zhengfu Zeren (环保法应写清楚政府责任) [Environmental 
Protection Law Should Stipulate Clearly the Government Responsibility], 
DONGFANG ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL MORNING POST] (Mar. 19, 2013), 
http://money.163.com/13/0319/10/8QAQRO6G00253B0H.html 
[https://perma.cc/M3XX-329H] (showing examples of NPC Standing 
Committee’s Legal Affairs Working Commission or the NPC Special Committees 
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number of instances where the NPC has declined to approve 
proposed bills submitted by the State Council.  
Despite this, the role of the NPC as a proponent for the rule of 
law in China is still quite limited.  This is not only because of 
problems common to legislatures in many countries, but also 
because of certain deficiencies specific to China.  Many legislatures 
grant administrative agencies quasi-legislative power, almost like a 
blank check with doctrines of non-delegation existing in name 
only.13  Administrative discretion is further compelled by out-of-
date statutes, insofar as legislatures cannot foresee everything or 
make laws in time to deal with every new change.  Moreover, the 
Chinese legislature has its own particular shortcomings.  First, the 
relationship between NPC deputies and their constituents is so weak 
that it is difficult for the legislative process to adequately reflect 
public concerns about regulating administration.14  Second, many 
NPC deputies and Standing Committee members are not legal 
professionals, and thus their capacity to propose and scrutinize bills 
is quite limited.15  Third, national legislative sessions are too short, 
                                                                                                           
taking over initial drafting). 
 13  See WILLIAM WADE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 388 (6th ed. 1988) 
(observing the connection between discretionary powers and the rule of law); 
Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1676–77 (1975) (discussing the loose legislative control of 
administrative discretion). 
 14 Jiang Jinsong (蒋劲松), Quanguo Renda Changweihui de 
Daibiaoxing Tantao (全国人大常委会的代表性探讨) [Discussion On the 
Representative Nature of the NPC Standing Committee], 26 ZHENGFA LUNTAN 
[TRIB. OF POL. SCI. AND L.] 19, 19–31 (2004); Zou Pingxue (邹平学), Renmin 
Daibiao Dahui De Guimo Kunjing yu Daibiaoxing de Luoji Beilun (人民代表大
会的规模困境与代表性的逻辑悖论) [The Scale Predicament and 
Representativeness Paradox of the People’s Congress], 18 RENDA YANJIU 
[PEOPLE’S CONG. RES.] 11, 11–15 (2009); Huang Xuexian & Zhu Zhongyi (黄学
贤&朱中一), Wanshan Renda Daibiao Daibiaoxing de Tantao (完善人大代表代
表性的探讨) [On the Improvement of the Representativeness of People’s 
Congress Deputies], 14 RENDA YANJIU [PEOPLE’S CONG. RES.] 5, 5–9 (2005). 
 15 Zhang Ruicun (张瑞存), Woguo Renda Daibiao Zhuanzhihua de 
Xianshi Zhang’ai Jiqi Weilai Fazhan (我国人大代表专职化的现实障碍及其未
来发展) [The Practical Obstacles and Future Development of the 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5
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as there is insufficient time for proper deliberation on proposed 
bills.16  Finally, as noted above, many bills are initially drafted by 
administrative agencies, and even with the new trend noted above,17 
departmentalism in the legislative process remains practically 
unavoidable.18 
Thus, while the NPC and its Standing Committee have made 
great progress by setting up the basic framework of Chinese 
administrative law over the past two and a half decades, it is 
difficult for the national legislature to promptly meet rising public 
demands for better laws regulating the administration.  For example, 
it took more than twenty-five years for the NPC to revise the 
Administrative Litigation Law (“ALL”) in November 2014, 
notwithstanding the many insufficiencies that became readily 
apparent and ever more acute as great economic and social changes 
took place.  Legislative promulgation of a general Administrative 
Procedure Law (“APL”), long discussed by Chinese administrative 
law scholars, was listed in 2013 in the legislative plan of the Tenth 
                                                                                                           
Professionalization of People’s Congress Deputies], 19 LILUN YU GAIGE [THEORY 
AND REFORM] 64, 64–66 (2004); Liu Shuhua & Guoying (刘淑华&郭颖), Lun 
Renda Daibiao Zhuanzhihua yu Woguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Zhidu de 
Wanshan (论人大代表专职化与我国人民代表大会制度的完善) [On 
Specialization of People’s Congress Deputies and Improvement of the People’s 
Congress System], 29 FAXUE ZAZHI [L. SCI. MAG.] 114, 114–16 (2008); Xie 
Xiangwei (谢祥为), Luelun Woguo Renda Daibiao de Zhuanzhihua (略论我国人
大代表的专职化) [On the Professionalization of People’s Congress Deputies], 12 
RENDA YANJIU [PEOPLE’S CONG. RES.] 4, 4–7 (2003). 
 16  The NPC holds its plenary meeting (lasting twelve days) once a year.  
The NPC Standing Committee meets for three to five days every two months. 
 17  See supra notes 11, 12, and accompanying text (detailing the trend). 
 18  Mao Shoulong (毛寿龙), Huajie Bumen Lifa Wenti de Zhidu Jiegou 
(化解部门立法问题的制度结构) [Dissolving the Institutional Structure 
Underlying Departmental Legislation], 20 LILUN SHIYE [THEORETICAL 
HORIZONS] 40, 40–47 (2012); Xu Yanhua & Han Liqiang (徐燕华&韩立强), 
Bumen Liyi: Bumen Lifa Mobuqu de Henji (部门利益——部门立法抹不去的痕
迹) [Departmental Interests: Non-Erasable Trace of Departmental Legislation], 
15 SHANXI JINGGUAN GAODENG ZHUANKE XUEXIAO XUEBAO [J. OF SHANXI 
POLICE ACAD.] 29, 29-32 (2007); Tang Yaoguo & Zhu Yingying (汤耀国&朱莹
莹), Chaoyue Bumen Lifa (超越部门立法) [Beyond Departmentalism In the 
Legislation], 27 LIAOWANG [OUTLOOK] 46, 46–47 (2007). 
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NPC Standing Committee as “a law which should be researched and 
drafted and, when ripe, submitted for discussion.”19 Yet in 2008 it 
was withdrawn from the legislative plan of the Eleventh NPC 
Standing Committee.20  In 2013, the APL was listed in the 
legislative plan of the Twelfth NPC Standing Committee, but as a 
third-category law (i.e., conditions not ripe for legislative review 
and further researched required) as opposed to a first-category law 
(i.e., conditions ripe for submission and discussion in the term) or a 
second-category law (i.e., subject to drafting for submission when 
conditions ripen).21  The arduous process of lawmaking does not 
necessarily mean that the NPC is not competent to regulate 
administration agencies, but it does reflect the pre-dominance of the 
administrative agencies in the ruling of China.  
 
B. Judicial Review 
 
In the current administrative law framework, and in particular 
under the ALL, courts are limited to reviewing “administrative 
actions.”22  The standard of judicial review is legality in its 
narrowest sense––although in a few cases, courts do step a little 
                                               
 19  Shijie Quanguo Renda Changweihui Lifa Guihua (十届全国人大常
委会立法规划) [Legislative Plan  of the Tenth NPC Standing Committee], 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2003/12/id/96741.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/EZ4Z-6QAG] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
 20  Shi’yijie Quanguo Renda Changweihui Lifa Guihua (十一届全国人
大常委会立法规划) [Legislative Plan of the Eleventh NPC Standing 
Committee], http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2008-
10/29/content_1455985.htm [https://perma.cc/J38H-5Y6M] (last visited Mar. 16, 
2017). 
 21  Shi’erjie Quanguo Renda Changweihui Lifa Guihua (十二届全国人
大常委会立法规划) [Legislative Plan of the Twelve NPC Standing Committee], 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/zgrdzz/2013-12/12/content_1816288.htm 
[https://perma.cc/3W53-M93E] (last visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
 22  Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 4, art. 2.  According to the 
newly revised ALL, “administrative action” includes administrative decision or 
measure without general binding effects, as well as administrative agreements 
(xingzheng xieyi). 
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further to examine the rationality of administrative actions.23  Like 
courts in most other countries, Chinese courts are not inflexible 
automatons.  In some administrative litigation cases, reviewing 
courts also have played the role of lawmakers, albeit in a somewhat 
disguised and very careful way. 
For example, even though there is no “due process clause” in 
the PRC Constitution, Chinese courts have, in some cases, required 
administrative agencies to follow fundamental principles of due 
process even when they are not clearly provided in relevant laws 
and regulations.  In one case, the appellate court stated: 
In the process of house demolition, given the principle 
of due process, in order to protect the legal interest of 
the house owner and/or lessee, the assessment report of 
the house to be demolished shall be served to the house 
owner and/or lessee, for them to know in time the 
assessment result, bring out their objections, if any, and 
apply for reassessment without delay.24   
In another case, the reviewing court ruled as follows: 
Even though the Law on Administrative Licensing does 
not specifically stipulate the procedure for annulling an 
administrative license, under Articles 5 and 7, the 
establishment and implementation of an administrative 
license shall abide by the principles of publicity, 
fairness and impartiality, and citizens, legal persons and 
other organizations are entitled to make statements and 
defend themselves while facing an agency 
                                               
 23  See Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 4, art. 70 (providing 
for the judicial review standards of “abuse of power” and “obvious 
inappropriateness” which are the basis for rationality review). 
 24 See Lutingzuo Su Shanghaishi Zhabeiqu Fangwutudi Guanliju 
Fangwuchaiqian Xingzhengcaijue Jiufenan (陆廷佐诉上海市闸北区房屋土地管
理局房屋拆迁行政裁决纠纷案) [Lu Tingzuo v. Housing and Land 
Administration of Zhabei District of Shanghai], 2007 SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. GAZ .  
(2nd Shanghai Interm. People’s Ct. Feb. 27, 2006), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=case&id=633 
[https://perma.cc/3LEH-8PSN]. 
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implementing an administrative license.  These 
provisions are the principles that shall be followed in 
the process of administrative licensing.  The defendant 
here shall abide by the above mentioned provisions.  
However, the defendant did neither notify the plaintiff 
nor give it the chance of statements and defense, as 
violated the principle of publicity stipulated by the Law 
on Administrative Licensing and the defendant’s right 
of statements and defense.  Besides, the notification of 
annulment without giving reasons is inconsistent with 
the basic requirements of administrative procedure.25 
Nevertheless, Chinese courts usually tend to rely on positive 
laws and regulations as the sole measuring stick for determining the 
legality of administrative action.26   Furthermore, the status of courts 
in the overall state power structure is relatively weak, mostly due to 
the lack of full independence.  Altogether, it is very difficult for 
courts to be a major producer of administrative law or act as the 
major external check on public administration.27  This is why 
                                               
 25  See Beijing Lilaodie Yutou Huoguo Youxiangongsi Fangzhuang 
Fengongsi Bufu Beijingshi Fengtaiqu Huanjingbaohuju Chexiao Huanbao 
Xingzheng Xukean (北京李老爹鱼头火锅有限公司方庄分公司不服北京市丰
台区环境保护局撤销环保行政许可案) [Fangzhuang Branch of Beijing Lilaodie 
Fish Hot Pot Co. Ltd. v. Bureau of Environment Protection of Fengtai District of 
Beijing],  (Beijing Fengtai Dist. People’s Ct. June 16, 2005),  
http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_a25051f3312b07f3f0f364c54a1ada4b6b0c858c2
62adcff.html?keywords=%E5%8C%97%E4%BA%AC%E6%9D%8E%E8%80%
81%E7%88%B9%E9%B1%BC%E5%A4%B4&match=Exact 
[https://perma.cc/HF3H-9ZW5]. 
 26  See, e.g., Ji Weidong (季卫东), Zhongguo Sifa de Siwei Fangshi jiqi 
Wenhua Tezheng (中国司法的思维方式及其文化特征) [The Thinking Style of 
the Chinese Judiciary and its Cultural Features], 3 FAL Ü FANGFA YU FALÜ SIWEI 
[LEGAL METHOD AND LEGAL THINKING] 68, 85 (2005) (“Generally, in modern 
China, the starting points for judicial thinking are the people’s sovereignty and the 
judiciary being subject to the legislature . . . The metaphor of a vending machine 
could also be applied.”). 
 27 WANG QINGHUA (汪庆华), ZHENGZHIZHONG DE SIFA: ZHONGGUO 
XINGZHENG SUSONG DE FALÜ SHEHUIXUE KAOCHA (政治中的司法：中国行政
诉讼的法律社会学考察) [THE JUDICIARY IN THE POLITICS: ADMINISTRATIVE 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5
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academics and the public hope for the improvement of judicial 
review of agency action rests not on the prospect of courts 
becoming more active and dynamic, but rather on the greater 
judicial authority that might derive from the implementation of the 
new revision of the ALL and from generally progressive judicial 
reform.  
 
II. Administrative Self-Regulation 
 
Given the abovementioned limitations on the Chinese 
legislature and judiciary, as potential checks on administrative 
action, the notion of the administration itself developing Chinese 
administrative law should not be discounted.  Indeed, administrative 
authorities have taken on this role ever since the policy of reform 
and opening-up was adopted in the late 1970s.  Most recently, the 
landmark event symbolizing such “administrative self-regulation” 
was the issuance of the State Council’s Decision on Promoting 
Administration According to Law in 1999 (“1999 Decision”),28 that 
was rooted in new language added to the Constitution the same year 
that identified the PRC as “a socialist country ruled by law.”29  
Since the 1999 Decision, the State Council has consecutively 
promulgated four related policy documents: the Outline on 
Comprehensively Promoting Administration According to Law in 
2004 (the “2004 Outline”),30 the State Council’s Decision on 
                                                                                                           
LITIGATION IN CHINA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL SOCIOLOGY] (2011). 
 28  Guowuyuan Guanyu Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng De Jueding (国
务院关于全面推进依法行政的决定) [State Council’s Decision on Promoting 
Administration According to Law] (promulgated by the St. Council Nov. 8, 1999, 
effective Nov. 8, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Decision]. 
 29  XIANFA art. 5 (1999).  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1999 
Xiuzheng) (中华人民共和国宪法(1999修正)) [Constitution of the People's 
Republic of China (1999 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s Cong., 
effective Mar., 15, 1999, amended Mar. 14, 2004) [hereinafter XIANFA], art. 5, 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=18536&lib=law&SearchKeyword
=&SearchCKeyword=%d6%d0%bb%aa%c8%cb%c3%f1%b9%b2%ba%cd%b9
%fa%cf%dc%b7%a8 [https://perma.cc/9Q6V-338R]. 
 30 Quanmian Tuijin Yifa Xingzheng Shishi Gangyao (全面推进依法行政
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
[2018] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 83 
 
Strengthening Administration According to Law at Municipal and 
County-Level Governments in 2008 (the “2008 Decision”),31  the 
State Council’s Opinions on Strengthening the Building of Rule of 
Law Government in 2010 (the “2010 Opinions”),32 and the 
Implementing Outline for Establishing Rule of Law Government 
(2015-2020) in 2015 jointly by CCCPC and the State Council.33 
Under Chinese law, these are not formal administrative regulations 
(xingzheng fagui) with legally binding effects.34  However, they are 
issued by the highest authority of the administrative system, and 
hence exercise very significant influence on State Council 
departments as well as local governments.  Following these policy 
documents, governments at or above the county level have worked 
to develop a range of internal checks on administrative behavior.  
                                                                                                           
实施纲要) [Outline on Comprehensively Promoting Administration According to 
Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Mar. 22, 2004, effective Mar. 22, 2004) 
[hereinafter 2004 Outline]. 
 31 Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Shixian Zhengfu Yifa Xingzheng De 
Jueding (国务院关于加强市县政府依法行政的决定) [ State Council’s Decision 
on Strengthening Administration According to Law at Municipal and County-
Level Governments] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 12, 2008, effective 
May 12, 2008), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-06/18/content_1020629.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P5AX-U8NB] [hereinafter 2008 Decision]. 
 32  Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe De Yijian (国务
院关于加强法治政府建设的意见) [State Council’s Opinions on Strengthening 
the Building of Rule of Law Government] (promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 
10,  2010, effective Oct. 10, 2010), http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2010-
11/08/content_1740765.htm [https://perma.cc/Y5P9-7MQB] [hereinafter 2010 
Opinions]. It was repealed by Guowuyuan Guanyu Xuanbu Shixiao Yipi 
Guowuyuan Wenjian de Jueding (国务院关于宣布失效一批国务院文件的决定) 
[Decision of the State Council on Repealing a Group of Documents of the St. 
Council, June 25, 2016, effective June 25, 2016] 
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=288188 
[https://perma.cc/NP7B-6XG3]. 
 33  Fazhi Zhengfu Jianshe Shishi Gangyao (2015-2020) (法治政府建设
实施纲要) [Implementing Outline for Establishing Rule of Law Government 
(2015-2020), (promulgated by CCCPC and the St. Council, Dec. 23, 2015, 
effective Dec. 23, 2015), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-
12/28/content_5028323.htm [https://perma.cc/L4V5-NGPZ]. 
 34  “Xingzheng fagui” refers to regulations formally enacted by the State 
Council. 
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Some key examples, further described below, include ex ante 
rulemaking procedures, post hoc review of promulgated rules, and 
the elaboration of criteria limiting the exercise of administrative 
discretion.     
A. Rulemaking Procedures and Examination of Legality 
 
The Law on Legislation incorporates administrative 
regulations (xingzheng fagui) (行政法规) and rules (guizhang) (规
章)35 into the category of law (fa) (法), and provides principles and 
frameworks concerning procedures for their formulation.  Further 
and more detailed procedural norms are stipulated in the State 
Council’s Ordinance on Procedures for the Formulation of 
Administrative Regulations36 and its Ordinance on Procedures for 
the Formulation of Rules.37  In addition to administrative 
regulations and rules, there are many so called “normative 
documents” (guifanxing wenjian) (规范性文件) produced by 
governments at various levels, from the central down to the most 
local.  It is crucial to pay more attention to and better regulate these 
guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) because many of them directly 
impact individual rights and duties.  Absent a uniform 
administrative procedure law, it appears the administrative regime is 
                                               
 35  “Guizhang” (规章) refers to the formal legislative rules made by the 
departments of the State Council, the provincial governments, the governments of 
the municipalities directly under the central government, or the governments of 
some larger cities. 
 36  Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (行政法规制定程序条例) 
[Ordinance for Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Rules] 
(promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002, amended 
Dec. 22, 2017, effective May 1, 2018),  http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-
01/16/content_5257039.htm [https://perma.cc/QL2E-U74L]. 
 37  Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli (规章制定程序条例) [Ordinance 
on Procedures for the Formulation of Rules] (promulgated by the St. Council, 
Nov. 16, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002, amended Dec. 22, 2017, effective May 1, 
2018), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2018-01/16/content_5257080.htm 
[https://perma.cc/BE49-BR3Q]. 
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attempting to “self-regulate” by delineating the procedures for 
formulation of such “normative documents.”  The 2004 Outline 
stipulates several requirements, including:  
1) The formulating agency shall hear wide-ranging public 
opinions in various ways while drafting guifanxing 
wenjian (规范性文件).  The agency shall solicit opinions 
from society on final drafts of great significance, through 
multiple and alternative procedures such as formal 
hearing, discussion meeting, or publication.  
2) The contents of the guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) 
shall be concrete, clear, and flexible, as well as capable of 
resolving problems in practice.  
3) The guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件), after being 
finalized, is to be published in the relevant government’s 
gazette, and on its official website, as well as in general 
circulation newspapers or journals. 
4) The agency shall attempt to set up and develop a 
regularized review system, aimed at “cleaning up” 
(qingli) (清理) conflicting or out-of-date guifanxing 
wenjian (规范性文件). 
5) The formulating agency and the enforcing agency are 
to regularly evaluate the enforcement of guifanxing 
wenjian (规范性文件), with the enforcing agency 
reporting its ongoing evaluation to the formulating 
agency.38 
Building on the 2004 Outline, the 2010 Opinions add these 
further requirements: 
1) No guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) is permitted to 
serve as the basis for an administrative license, 
administrative punishment or administrative compulsory 
                                               
 38  2004 Outline, supra note 30, art. 16, 18. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5
86 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13] 
 
measure, or to impose new duties on a citizen, legal 
person or other organization. 
2) Guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) which directly 
influence the rights and duties of a citizen, legal person or 
other organization must be publicized for public 
comment, reviewed for lawfulness by the relevant 
legislative affairs office, and discussed by the executive 
conference of the local government. 
3) Local governments are to work towards unifying the 
registration, serial numbers, and publication of their (or 
their departments’) guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件).39 
The prescriptions in the 2004 Outline and the 2010 Opinions 
do not have legally binding effects under orthodox administrative 
law doctrines, but they do have significant practical influence on 
subordinate administrative agencies.  There are at least six 
departments of the State Council,40 and thirty-eight provincial and 
                                               
 39  2010 Opinions, supra note 32, art. 9. 
 40  See, e.g., Guojia Zongjiao Shiwuju Guizhang He Guifanxing Wenjian 
Zhiding Chengxu Guiding (国家宗教事务局规章和规范性文件制定程序规定) 
[Provisions of the State Administration for Religious Affairs on Procedures for the 
Formulation of Regulations and Normative Documents] (promulgated by the St. 
Admin. Religious Affairs, Aug. 11, 2010, effective Aug. 11, 2010), 
http://sara.gov.cn/xxgk/zcfg/bmgz/5089.htm; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Haishiju Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding Chengxu Guiding (中华人民共和国海事
局规范性文件制定程序规定) [Provisions of the Maritime Safety Administration 
on Procedures for the Formulation of Maritime Normative Documents] 
(promulgated by the Mar. Safety Admin., May 4, 2010, effective July 1, 2010); 
Guojia Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyan Jianyi Zongju Guifanxing Wenjian Guanli Banfa 
(国家质量监督检验检疫总局规范性文件管理办法) [Administrative Measures 
of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine 
for Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Gen. Admin. Quality 
Supervision, Inspection, & Quarantine, March 15, 2010, effective May 1, 2010); 
Shuishou Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding Guanli Banfa (税收规范性文件制定管理
办法) [Administrative Measures for the Formulation of Tax Normative 
Documents] (promulgated by the St. Admin. Taxation, Feb. 1, 2010, effective Jul. 
1, 2010), 
http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810765/n812161/n812579/c1086146/conte
nt.html [https://perma.cc/5RAJ-865G]; Zhongguo Minyong Hangkong Zongju 
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municipal governments that have issued follow-up regulations 
concerning the procedures for formulating guifanxing wenjian (规
范性文件).41  In addition, there have been at least six ministerial or 
local government rules issued concerning the “lawfulness review” 
of guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件).42  Of course, the actual 
                                                                                                           
Zhineng Bumen Guifanxing Wenjian Zhiding Chengxu Guiding (中国民用航空
总局职能部门规范性文件制定程序规定) [Procedural Provisions on the 
Formulation of Normative Documents by the Functional Departments under the 
General Administration of Civil Aviation of China]  (promulgated by the Gen. 
Admin. Civ. Aviation, Aug. 31, 2007, effective Oct. 10, 2007), 
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zcfb/200212/20021200059849.shtml; Duiwai 
Maoyi Jingji Hezuobu Falü, Xingzheng Fagui Qicao Ji Guizhang, Guifanxing 
Wenjian Zhiding Banfa (对外贸易经济合作部法律，行政法规起草及规章，规
章规范性文件制定办法) [Measures of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
Economic Cooperation for the Drafting of Laws and Administrative Regulations 
and the Formulation of Ministerial Rules and Normative Documents] 
(promulgated by the Ministry Foreign Trade & Econ. Cooperation, Aug. 1, 2002, 
effective Sept. 1, 2002), 
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=5731&CGid= 
[https://perma.cc/RG7J-5FF7] (listing examples of follow-up regulations 
concerning the procedures for formulating guifanxing wenjian issued by six 
departments of the State Council). 
 41 Infra note 41. The referenced provinces and municipalities are 
Shenzhen, Tianjin, Zhengzhou, Anhui, Shanxi, Guangzhou, Shanghai, Qingdao, 
Jiangxi, Xinjiang, Yunnan, Sichuan, Hainan, Ningxia, Guangxi, Shantou, Urumqi, 
Shijiazhuang, Nanchang, Shaanxi, Wuhan, Suzhou, Jinan, Xi’an, Luoyang, 
Gansu, Heilongjiang, Handan, Jiangsu, Xining, Hunan, Liaoning, Chengdu, 
Guiyang, Zhuhai, Zhejiang, Hebei, and Xiamen. 
 42See, e.g., Changshashi Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha 
Shenqing Banli Gongzuo Guiding (长沙市规范性文件合法性审查申请办理工
作) [Measures of Changsha for the Application for and Handling of Lawfulness 
Review of Normative Documents] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Changsha Municipality, Dec. 16, 2010, effective Feb. 1, 2011), 
http://www.changsha.gov.cn/xxgk/gfxwj/wjcl/201601/t20160111_872858.html 
[https://perma.cc/FZ2L-ZF79]; Huizhoushi Zhengfu Bumen Guifanxing Wenjian 
Hefaxing Shencha Zhidu (惠州市政府部门规范性文件合法性审查制度) 
[Lawfulness Review System for Normative Documents by the Functional 
Departments of Huizhou Municipality Government] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Huizhou Municipality, Feb. 23, 2010, effective Feb. 23, 2010), 
http://xxgk.huizhou.gov.cn/0000/0201/201608/ee0975abb57f4b898b42c211e7710
127.shtml [https://perma.cc/J9QG-B4U4]; Guotu Ziyuan Guanli Guifanxing 
Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha Banfa (国土资源管理规范性文件合法性审查办法) 
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implementation of these rules is still unclear and requires more 
empirical study.  Promulgation itself does not necessarily suggest 
that there have been great advances in the regulation of guifanxing 
wenjian (规范性文件) in practice.  However, since these rules are 
well-publicized, it is certainly within legitimate public expectation 
that administrative agencies shall follow these procedural 
requirements when formulating guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件). 
B. Filing and Check 
 
The processes of NPC review for constitutionality and legality 
established by the Law on Legislation apply inter alia to 
administrative regulations (xingzheng fagui) (行政法规) and local 
regulations (difangxing fagui) (地方性法规).43  Any citizen or 
                                                                                                           
[Measures for Lawfulness Review of Normative Documents on Land and 
Resources Administration] (promulgated by the Ministry Land & Res., Nov. 27, 
2006, effective Jan. 1, 2007), 
http://www.mlr.gov.cn/zwgk/flfg/gtzybl/200612/t20061227_648779.htm 
[https://perma.cc/P8YP-WDM7]; 
Shengzhengfu Bumen Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha Zanxing Guiding 
(省政府部门规范性文件合法性审查暂行规定) [Interim Provisions on 
Lawfulness Review of Normative Documents by the Functional Departments of 
Hebei Provincial Government] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Hebei 
Provincial Gov’t, Nov. 4, 2006, effective Dec. 1, 2006); Zhejiangsheng Guotu 
Ziyuan Guanli Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha Banfa (浙江省国土资源管
理规范性文件合法性审查办法) [Measures for Lawfulness Review of the 
Normative Documents on Land and Resources Administration of Zhejiang 
Province] (promulgated by Zhejiang Admin. Land & Res., Sep. 27, 2006, 
effective Sep. 27, 2006), 
www.zjlic.com/admin/eWeb/uploadfile/20090730084200409.doc; Hebeisheng 
Laodong He Shehui Baozhangting Guifanxing Wenjian Hefaxing Shencha He 
Bei’an Banfa (Zanxing) (河北省劳动和社会保障厅规范性文件合法性审查和
备案办法)（暂行）[Interim Measures for Lawfulness Review and Filing of 
Normative Documents by the Labor and Social Security Department of Hebei 
Province] (promulgated by Heibei Dep’t Lob. & Soc. Sec., Aug. 3, 2005, effective 
Aug. 3, 2005) (listing six examples of ministerial or local government rules issued 
concerning the “lawfulness review” of guifanxing wenjian). 
 43  “Difangxing fagui” (地方性法规) refers to the local statutes made by 
provincial and municipal people’s congresses and their standing committees. 
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organization has the right to submit a proposal or request for such 
review to the NPC Standing Committee.44  In the absence of 
Western-style separation of powers, in practice, this review 
mechanism has developed into, this paper would call, a model of 
“proposal + self-correction.”  
The Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) case in 200345 and the Tang 
Fuzhen (唐福珍) case in 200946 are the best illustrations of this 
                                               
 44 See Articles 99 and 100 of the Law on Legislation (stipulating 
individual and other organizations have rights to submit written legal review 
suggestions). 
 45  On March 17, 2003, a 27 year old migrant worker named Sun 
Zhigang (孙志刚) was sent to and detained in the housing & repatriation center in 
Guangzhou only because he was found without an ID card by the local police.  At 
the station, he was beaten to death by other detainees.  Media reports on this case 
aroused widespread concern, as well as brought attention to the legality of the 
State Council’s Measures for Housing and Repatriating City Vagrants and 
Beggars (Chengshi Liulang Qitao Renyuan Shourong Qiansong Banfa) (城市流
浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法).  See Sun Zhigang An Zhongjie Shourong Qiansong 
Banfa? (孙志刚案终结收容遣送办法?)[The case of Sun Zhigang terminated the 
Measures for Housing and Repatriating City Vagrants and Beggars?], SOUHU 
WANG [SOHU.COM] (last visited Nov.4, 2017), 
http://news.sohu.com/04/92/subject209299204.shtml [https://perma.cc/MAP5-
B4M5] (discussing the Sun Zhigang case and relevant impact it brings).  In large 
part due to the petitions for review of this regulation that were successively made 
by three law Ph.D. students, followed by five more senior legal scholars (of which 
the author was one), the State Council eventually annulled the aforementioned 
regulation, and replaced the outdated housing & repatriation system with the 
social relief system. 
 46  On November 13, 2009, a female entrepreneur named Tang Fuzhen 
set herself on fire to protest the forced demolition of her factory buildings, which 
were controversially determined to be illegal by the local government in Sichuan 
province.  Her death, after sixteen days of hospital treatment, provoked extensive 
discussion in the media.  See Chengdu Chaiqian Zifen Shijian Diaocha Tongbao 
(成都“拆迁自焚”事件调查通报) [The Investigation report on Chengdu “Self-
burning during House Demolition” case], SICHUAN XINWENWANG (Dec. 3, 
2009), http://society.people.com.cn/GB/41158/10506824.html 
[https://perma.cc/HEZ2-EXPE] (introducing the case background and government 
disposal of the case).  On this basis, five law professors from Peking University 
Law School (including the author) submitted to the NPC Standing Committee a 
proposal for review of the constitutionality and legality of the State Council’s 
Regulation on Urban Housing Demolition (Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli 
Tiaoli) (城市房屋拆迁管理条例).  After more than a year, the State Council 
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model.  In both cases, legal academics (including this author) filed a 
request to the Legislative Affairs Committee of the NPC Standing 
Committee, hoping to activate the review procedure with respect to 
two problematic regulations.  However, the review procedure was 
not formally initiated in either case by the NPC Standing 
Committee.  Instead, largely opaque communications between the 
NPC and the State Council substituted for formal NPC review.47  
Ultimately, it was the State Council itself, rather than the NPC, that 
abolished the challenged measures: in the Sun Zhigang (孙志刚) 
case, through its Measures on Custody and Repatriation of Vagrants 
and Urban Beggars,48 and in the Tang Fuzhen (唐福珍) case, 
through its Regulation on Urban Housing Demolition.49 
This model of administrative self-correction extends broadly.  
In 1987, the General Office of the State Council issued its Notice of 
Archival Filing of Rules by Local Governments and Departments of 
the State Council,50 which expressly required that ministerial rules 
(bumen guizhang) (部门规章) and local government rules (difang 
guizhang) (地方规章) be submitted to the State Council for archival 
                                                                                                           
annulled this regulation and replaced it with a new, improved regulation on urban 
takings and compensation thereafter. 
 47 Based on this author’s personal experience, these communications 
between the two governmental organs were supplemented by several semi-formal 
hearings in which the NPC and the State Council solicited public and expert 
opinions. 
 48 Chengshi Liulang Qitao Renyuan Shourong Qiansong Banfa (城市流
浪乞讨人员收容遣送办法) [Measures on Custody and Repatriation of Vagrants 
and Urban Beggars] (promulgated by the St. Council, May 12, 1982, effective 
May 12, 1982, abolished Aug. 1, 2003). 
 49  Chengshi Fangwu Chaiqian Guanli Tiaoli (城市房屋拆迁管理条例) 
[Regulation on Urban Housing Demolition] (promulgated by the St. Council, Jun. 
13, 2001, effective Nov. 1, 2001, abolished Jan. 21, 2011). 
 50  Guowuyuan Bangongting Guanyu Difang Zhengfu He Guowuyuan 
Gebumen Guizhang Bei’an Gongzuo de Tongzhi (国务院办公厅关于地方政府
和国务院各部门规章备案工作的通知) [Notice of Archival Filing of Rules by 
Local Governments and Departments of the State Council] (promulgated and 
effective Mar. 7, 1987). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
[2018] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 91 
 
filing.  In 1990, the State Council promulgated an administrative 
regulation for this system of “filing and check” (bei’an) (备案), the 
Provisions on the Filing of Regulations and Government Rules.51  
Under this regulation, the Legislative Bureau of the State Council52 
undertook the task of “filing and checking” regulations (fagui) (法
规) and government rules (guizhang) (规章), examining the legality 
and consistency of this administrative work-product.  Some ten 
years later, the passage of the Law on Legislation in 2001 also 
propelled the State Council to issue a new Ordinance on the Filing 
of Regulations and Government Rules,53 which abolished the earlier 
regulation but retained the system of “filing and check.”  The new 
ordinance follows the Law on Legislation by also permitting 
individuals to request such agency review.54  
The 2004 Outline expands the “filing and check” mechanism 
to all guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件) issued by administrative 
agencies.55  The 2010 Opinions further stipulates in detail:  
A request for examination by a citizen, legal person or 
other organization shall be handled strictly according to 
relevant provisions.  Illegal government rules and 
normative documents shall be reported without delay to 
the authoritative organ for revocation, and the results of 
the examination shall be publicized.  Also, the filing 
                                               
 51  Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Guiding (法规规章备案规定) [Provisions on 
the Filing of Regulations and Government Rules] (promulgated by the St. 
Council, Feb. 18, 1990, effective Feb. 18, 1990, abolished Jan. 1, 2002). 
 52  The Legislative Bureau of the State Council was the predecessor of 
the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council. 
 53  Fagui Guizhang Bei’an Tiaoli (法规规章备案条例) [Ordinance on 
the Filing of Regulations and Government Rules] (promulgated by the St. 
Council, Dec. 14, 2001, effective Jan. 1, 2002). 
 54 Article 9 of the Ordinance on the Filing of Regulations and 
Government Rules. 
 55  See Article 29 of the 2004 Outline cited supra note 30 (stipulating that 
should any individual or organization dispute the regulation or government rules, 
the promulgating agency or executing agency should study and deal with it). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol13/iss1/5
92 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 13] 
 
oversight body shall publish a catalog of government 
rules and normative documents that have been filed and 
examined.56 
On the impetus of the State Council, many of its 
departments57 and at least thirty provincial and municipal 
governments58 have since promulgated rules in regards to the “filing 
and check” of guifanxing wenjian (规范性文件). 
C. Criteria for Exercise of Administrative Discretion 
 
In any modern administrative state, it is unavoidable that 
legislators will delegate broad discretion to administrative agencies.  
However, the exercise of such discretion by administrators can 
result in substantial unfairness.  In order to try to regularize the 
exercise of administrative discretion, the 2008 Decision provides:  
It is necessary to earnestly induce administrative 
agencies to comb through provisions that stipulate 
discretion concerning administrative punishments and 
administrative licensing, and to detail their 
administrative discretion in terms of the practical 
development of the local economy and society, to 
                                               
 56  Article 10 of the 2010 Opinions cited supra note 32 (detailing the 
requirements on government to deal with citizen or organizational request). 
 57  See, e.g., Shuilibu Guifanxing Wenjian Shencha Yu Bei’an Guanli 
Banfa (水利部规范性文件审查与备案管理办法) [Administrative Measures of 
the Ministry of Water Resources on the Examination and Filing of Normative 
Documents] (promulgated and effective Aug. 3, 2005); Jiaotong Guifanxing 
Wenjian Bei’an Shencha Zhidu (交通规范性文件备案审查制度) [System of the 
Filing and Examination of Normative Documents of Communication 
Administration]  (promulgated  Sep. 25, 1996, effective Oct. 1, 1996); 
Nengyuanbu Guizhang, Guifanxing Wenjian Bei’an Banfa (能源部规章规范性文
件备案办法) [Measures of the Ministry of Energy on the Filing of Regulations 
and Normative Documents] (promulgated and effective Oct. 5, 1990) (all listing 
the “filing and check” rules on normative documents). 
 58  These are Zhengzhou, Liaoning, Jiangxi, Handan, Fushun, Guizhou, 
Shanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Hubei, Inner Mongolia, Yunnan, Sichuan, 
Shandong, Yinchuan, Hainan, Ningxia, Beijing, Nanchang, Anhui, Suzhou, 
Henan, Luoyang, Lanzhou, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, Guiyang, Shanghai, and 
Fujian. 
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quantify discretion that is capable of quantification, and 
to publicize and implement such detailed and quantified 
standards for the exercise of administrative discretion.59  
This provision does not expressly reference the concept of 
“criteria for administrative discretion” (xingzheng cailiang jizhun) (
行政裁量基准), but instead uses the concept of “standard for 
administrative discretion” (xingzheng cailiang biaozhun) (行政裁量
标准).  Yet, both academics and practitioners soon began to use the 
terminology of “criteria,”60 and the 2010 Opinions hence adopted 
that common usage: 
They shall establish basic criteria for administrative 
discretion, scientifically and reasonably detail and 
quantify administrative discretion, improve the rules for 
application, strictly standardize the exercise of 
administrative discretion, and avoid arbitrary law 
enforcement.61 
Local governments have initially focused on discretionary 
criteria for the exercise of administrative punishment, and these 
form the main bulk of existing “criteria for administrative 
                                               
 59  2008 Decision, supra note 31, art. 18. 
 60  See, e.g., Yu Lingyun, Youzou Zai Guifan Yu Jianghua Zhijian: Dui 
Jinhua Xingzheng Cailiang Jizhun Shijian de Sikao (游走在规范与僵化之間：
对金华行政裁量基准实践的思考),Wandering Between the Regulation and the 
Ossification: Reflection on the Practice of Criteria for Administrative Discretion 
in Jinhua, 3 QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA L. REV.] 54, 54-80 (2008); Zhang Yan, 
et al., Shenzhen Shixing Zhi’an An Ziyou Cailiang (深圳试行治安案自由裁量) 
[Shenzhen Tries the Discretionary Criteria in Public Security Cases] 
SHENZHEN SHANGBAO [Shenzhen Economic Daily], July 16, 2004. Zhu 
Mang, Riben Xingzheng Chengxu Fa Zhong de Cailiang Jizhun Zhidu (日本行政
程序法中的裁量基准制度) [Discretionary Criteria System in the Japanese 
Administrative Procedure Law], 1 HUADONG ZHENGFA XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. E. 
CHINA U. POL. SCI. AND L.] 73, 73–79 (2006); Zhou Youyong, Cailiang Jizhun de 
Zhengdangxing Wenti (裁量基准的正当性问题) [On the Legitimacy of the 
Discretionary Criteria], 6 ZHONGGUO FAXUE [China Legal Sci.] 22, 22–32 
(2007). 
 61  2010 Opinions, supra note 32, art. 16. 
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discretion” thus far.  Examples include rules promulgated by the 
Construction Commission of Hangzhou City in 2010, by the 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development Department of Zhejiang 
Province in 2010, by the Education Bureau of Changsha City in 
2010, and by the Bureau of Supervision and Administration of 
Work Safety of Jiangsu Province in 2009.62  
Discretionary criteria are, on one hand, useful for controlling 
the exercise of broad administrative discretion within the scope of 
rationality.  On the other hand, they may be so detailed and concrete 
that they “ossify” the exercise of discretion.63  However, given the 
breadth of discretion that is granted to administrative agencies in 
China, and the serious abuses that have resulted, the advantages of 
administratively developed “criteria for discretion”—binding not 
through legal obligation but on the basis of bureaucratic hierarchy—
outweigh the disadvantages. 
 
D. Additional Examples 
                                               
 62 Zhejiangsheng Zhufang He Chengxiang Jiansheting Gongcheng 
Jianshe Lingyu Xingzheng Chufa Cailiang Jizhun (Shixing) (浙江省住房和城乡
建设厅工程建设领域行政处罚裁量基准（试行）) [Zhejiang Housing and 
Urban-Rural Development Department (Trial) Discretionary Criteria for 
Administrative Punishment in the Area of Engineering 
Construction ](promulgated by Zhejiang Housing and Urban-Rural Development 
Department, Dec. 22, 2010, effective Jan. 1, 2011); Changshashi Jiaoyuju 
Xingzheng Chufa Cailiangquan Jizhun (长沙市教育局行政处罚裁量权基
准)[Changsha Education Bureau Discretionary Criteria for Administrative 
Punishment ] (promulgated by Changsha Education Bureau, effective Nov. 1, 
2010); Hangzhoushi Gongcheng Jianshe Guanli Xingzheng Chufa Cailiang Guize 
(杭州市工程建设管理行政处罚裁量规则) [Hangzhou Construction 
Commission Rules on Discretion in Administrative Punishment for Engineering 
Construction] (promulgated by Hangzhou Construction Commission, Oct. 15, 
2010, revised June 16, 2011); Jiangsusheng Anquan Shengchan Xingzheng Chufa 
Ziyou Cailiangquan Shiyong Guize (江苏省安全生产行政处罚自由裁量权使用
规则) [Jiangsu Bureau of Supervision and Administration of Work Safety Rules 
for Discretion in Administrative Punishment in the Area of Work Safety] 
(promulgated by Jiangsu Bureau of Supervision and Administration of Work 
Safety, Aug. 31, 2009). 
 63  See Yu Lingyun, supra note 60 (discussing the discretionary criteria 
for administrative discretion in Jinhua). 
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The areas or issues covered by “administrative self-
regulation” are certainly not limited just to the above-mentioned 
examples of ex ante rule-making procedures, post hoc review of 
promulgated rules, and criteria for the exercise of administrative 
discretion.  Chinese administration is also working to realize “the 
rule of rules” by creating a large body of rules on aspects of major 
decision-making procedures, disclosure of government information, 
and administrative accountability, among other topics.64 
The term “major decision-making” (zhongda juece) first 
appeared in the State Council’s 2004 Outline, and subsequently was 
included in the 2008 Decision and the 2010 Opinions.  Pursuant to 
these documents, by July 2014, the departments of the State Council 
and governments at or above the county level issued at least 2,226 
rules or documents stipulating major decision-making procedures, at 
different levels of detail.65  Although the precise definition of 
“major decision-making” is still not sufficiently clear and unified, 
this national and local normative elaboration has actually, to some 
extent, regularized the procedures for administrative decisions 
which may have significant, large-scale impact.  However, this term 
has not yet appeared in any statute promulgated by the NPC and its 
Standing Committee. 
Neither has the disclosure of government information ever 
been made a legal requirement by the NPC and its Standing 
Committee.  Since the enactment of the State Council’s Regulation 
on Open Government Information (“OGI Regulation”) in 2007, the 
General Office of the State Council has issued nine documents, 
                                               
 64  “The rule of rules” is actually an extension of “the rule of law,” 
premised on the fact that public matters are mostly regulated under agency rules 
rather than law enacted by the NPC.  See Xixin Wang, Rule of Rules: An Inquiry 
into Administrative Rules in China’s Rule of Law Context, in THE RULE OF LAW: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM, 71-89 (The Mansfield Center for Pacific 
Affairs, 2000) (explaining “the rule of rules”). 
 65Laws & Regulations Database of China Law Info, 
http://chinalawinfo.com (accessed by searching the keyword zhongda xingzheng 
juece [major decision-making]). 
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departments of the State Council have issued 293 documents, and 
governments at or above the county level have issued 2,205 
documents, altogether meant to promote government openness by 
providing more detailed interpretations, guidance, and procedural 
requirements, as well as by publicizing relevant work reports.66  
Although many of these additional rules elaborating the disclosure 
of government information are essentially very similar to the OGI 
Regulation, the sum total really does help to push forward gradual 
and incremental changes. 
Lastly, a new approach to top-down accountability was set in 
motion by the eruption of SARS in 2003, which caused 349 death 
all over the country, and eventually led to the dismissals of many 
government officials, the highest being the Minister of Health, 
Zhang Wenkang, and the mayor of Beijing, Meng Xuenong.67  
Many provincial governors were shocked by these dismissals, and 
for a time adjusted their focus from enhancing GDP to handling 
SARS.68  The so-called “accountability storm” from this period is 
widely accepted as the basis for strengthening top-down 
accountability more systematically.  Since that time, the CCP 
Central Committee and the State Council have separately or jointly 
issued a series of rules designed to heighten accountability for Party 
and government leaders at different levels.  The most significant and 
regularized mechanisms are provided in the Interim Provisions on 
Accountability for Party and Government Leaders (Guanyu Shixing 
Dangzheng Lingdao Ganbu Wenze de Zanxing Guiding) that was 
                                               
 66  This data is obtained from the Laws & Regulations Database of China 
Law Info, http://www/chinalawinfo.com (accessed by searching the keyword 
zhengfu xinxi gongkai [open government information]). 
 67  See Zhang Hui, “Feidian” Shinian: Shenghuo Jiu Zheyang Gaibian (“
非典”十年：生活就这样改变) [ The Decade of SARS: Life Has Changed], 
MINZHU YU FAZHI SHIBAO [THE DEMOCRACY AND LAW TIMES], Apr. 
8, 2013. 
 68  See Shou Beibei, Wenze Yinian: “Xiake” Guanyuan Jin Anzai? (问责
一年：“下课”官员今安在?) 
 [After One Year: Where Are the Dismissed Officials?], NANFANG ZHOUMO [S. 
WEEKEND], July 8, 2004 (discussing what happened after the dismissals). 
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issued by the General Offices of the CCP Central Committee and 
the State Council in 2009.  Subsequently, there have been at least 
twenty-two implementing rules issued by local party offices and 
governments.69  This top-down internal instrument is to make the 
administrative leaders at different levels accountable for important 
decisions and serious incidents or accidents which arouse wide 
concern.  The fact that it is mostly not based on democracy but 
rather on bureaucracy may discount the expected effect of this kind 
of accountability to improve the competence as well as the reliance 
of public administration.  However, it really places more burden 
than before on the shoulders of the administrative leaders to be 
responsive to the public needs or concerns. 
 
III. Dynamics 
 
The insufficiency of external regulation is, of course, one of 
the reasons for the rise of “administrative self-regulation.”  The key 
question is why the administrative regime has the motivation to 
consider self-constraint notwithstanding the loopholes of external 
regulation, rather than “gallop in the broad land” granted by the 
legislators?  Also, to what extent is administrative self-regulation, as 
a driver for the advancement of the rule of administrative law, 
worthy of belief and reliance?  Arguably, it is the following 
dynamics that are in favor of such administrative self-regulation.  
 
A. Demand for Rational-Legal Authority 
 
It appears that the “New China”—from the leadership of Mao 
Zedong, to Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao and now Xi 
Jingping—has experienced the progressive decline of Weberian 
                                               
 69“Laws & Regulations Database” of China Law Info, 
http://www.chinalawinfo.com (accessed by searching the keyword dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu wenze [accountability for the leaders of the Party and 
Government]). 
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charismatic authority.70  In the process of leading China to 
transform from an agricultural society to an industrial society, and 
overseeing migration from rural areas to cities, it has proven 
impossible for Chinese rulers, facing the continuing task of 
modernization, to withdraw to traditional forms of authority.71  
Rational-legal authority seems to be the sole option for China’s 
rulers, provided the aims remain fixed to economic growth, political 
stability, social justice, and long-term acceptance by the Chinese 
people.  Basically, this has become the consensus of China’s 
leadership since Deng Xiaoping’s tenure.  In December of 1978, 
Deng Xiaoping said: 
It is necessary to strengthen the legal system in order to 
guarantee the people’s democracy.  It is necessary to 
institutionalize democracy and concretize it into laws.  
The institutions and laws thus created are not to be 
changed just due to the change of leaders, are not to be 
changed just due to the change of viewpoints and 
attention of leaders.72 
Ye Jianying, another very important and influential leader 
during the time of Deng Xiaoping, also declared that a country must 
                                               
 70  See JOANNA WALEY-COHEN, THE SEXTANTS OF BEIJING: GLOBAL 
CURRENTS IN CHINESE HISTORY 279 (1999) (noting that many government 
leaders of the 1990s lacked the prestige of Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping).  See 
also Li Lin, Deng Xiaoping Yu Dangdai Zhongguo Zhengzhi Quanwei de 
Lixinghua (邓小平与当代中国政治权威的理性化) [Deng Xiaoping and the 
Rationalization of Current Political Authority in China], 2 ZHONGGONG QINGDAO 
SHIWEI DANGXIAO, QINGDAO XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. OF THE PARTY 
SCH. OF CPC QINGDAO MUN. COMMITTEE (QINGDAO ADMIN. C.)] 15, 15–18 
(2006) (describing the type of leadership of Deng Xiaoping). 
 71  Weberian traditional forms of authority are arguably more easily 
rooted in societies consisting of a small-peasant economy, totalitarian politics, 
and closed culture.  Ren Jiantao, Daode Yu Zhongguo Chuantong Zhengzhi de 
Hefaxing (道德与中国传统政治的合法性) [Morality and the Legitimacy of 
Traditional Politics of China], 1 HUAZHONG SHIFAN DAXUE XUEBAO (RENWEN 
SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. OF HUAZHONG NORMAL U. (HUMANITIES AND SOC. SCI.)] 
27, 27–34 (2005). 
 72  DENG XIAOPING (邓小平), DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN (邓小平文选) 
[SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING]146 (1994). 
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be ruled by laws and institutions that have stability, continuity, and 
foremost authority; he said it is only through legal procedures that 
laws and institutions are to be revised—they should not be changed 
due to the change in will of any particular leader.73  Since the end of 
the Cultural Revolution, the demand for rational-legal authority has 
been continuing and even increasing.74  Given that background, and 
where the legislature or judiciary lacks capacity to control the 
administration, there is reason for the administrative regime itself to 
pursue a type of “self-regulation,” aiming thereby to realize an 
“administration by rules.”  The mostly hierarchical administration 
would operate more on the rules rather than on the arbitrary and 
unaccountable wills of the leaders, which are deemed as one of the 
evil sources of huge disorders such as the Cultural Revolution. 
 
B. Soil for Ideologies of Democracy and the Rule of Law 
 
China currently remains in transition from an agricultural 
society to a more urban one.  In 2010, the population of rural areas 
remains 720 million.  (This number does not include the 
approximately 170–180 million people who are still classified as 
farmers in terms of the residence registration (hukou) system, but 
who have left the countryside and lived for more than six months in 
                                               
 73  Liu Zheng, Xinshiqi de Renda Gongzuo Cong Zheli Qibu: Wujie 
Quanguo Renda Erci Huiyi de Gongji (新时期的人大工作从这里起步——五届
全国人大二次会议的功绩) [The Work of the People’s Congress In the New Era 
Starts From Here: Achievements of the Second Session of the Fifth National 
People’s Congress], 12 ZHONGGUO RENDA [CHINESE PEOPLE’S CONGRESS] 40, 
40–41 (2002). 
 74  When emphasizing the importance of stability and continuity of laws 
and systems, Ye Jianying observed that the cost of this lesson was paid with the 
blood drawn by Lin Biao and the “Gang of Four.”  Id. at 40.  It reflects a starting 
point for the Chinese demand for rational-legal authority in the aftermath of the 
Cultural Revolution.  Wang Xiaoming & Huang Weiping, Lun Xinshiji Zhongguo 
Gongchandang de Zhizheng Jichu (论新世纪中国共产党的执政基础) [On the 
Legitimate Basis of the Chinese Communist Party’s Ruling Position in the New 
Century] 5 SHENZHEN DAXUE XUEBAO [J. OF SHENZHEN U.] 13, 21–22 (2001). 
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cities or towns).75  The transition in question is and will be from a 
situation of rural areas suffering negative effects from cities to the 
unified development of urban-rural areas; from a society based on 
acquaintances (shuren shehui)76 to a society of strangers; and from 
fragmented and diverse rural lifestyles to a relatively uniform urban 
lifestyle.  Amidst this transition, there is ever greater economic and 
social “soil” for the ideologies of democracy and the rule of law to 
take root.  
Indeed, democracy and the rule of law have been recognized 
by the Chinese leadership as among the ruling ideologies.  This is 
illustrated by the addition of this sentence: “[t]he People's Republic 
of China governs the country according to law and makes it a 
socialist country under rule of law” into the PRC Constitution in 
1999,77 and also by the State Council’s subsequent issuance of the 
1999 Decision, the 2004 Outline and the 2010 Opinions.  With 
further change in economic and social conditions, there certainly 
will be a greater number of people supportive of these ideologies 
and aware of the significance of democracy and the rule of law for 
                                               
 75  Xing Shiwei, Zhongguo Nongcun Renkou 30 Nianhou Jiang Jianzhi 4 
Yi (中国农村人囗30年后将减至4亿) [The Population of Rural Areas Will Be 
Decreased to 400 Million 30 Years After], XINGJING BAO [BEIJING NEWS], (Feb. 
24, 2010). 
 76  The concept of “shuren shehui” was proposed by a well-known 
sociologist Fei Xiaotong, which is regarded as a classical description of the 
characteristics of Chinese traditional rural society.  People in shuren shehui not 
only know each other but also have mutual trust and subconscious compliance 
with behavioral customs due to their long life together and intimate relationships.  
FEI XIONGTONG (费孝通), EARTH-BOUND CHINA REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEM, 9–10, 
44, (Beijing: Peking University Press, 1998); Chen Baifeng, Shuren Shehui: 
Cunzhuang Zhixu Jizhi de Lixiangxing Tanjiu (熟人社会：村庄秩序机制的理
想型探究熟人社會：村莊秩序機制的理想型探究) [On the Acquaintance 
Community: An Ideal-Type Exploration of the Mechanism in the Village Order], 1 
SHEHUI [CHINESE J. OF SOC.] 223, 224–26 (2011). 
 77  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1999 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共
和国宪法(1999修正)) [Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1999 
Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People's Cong., Mar. 15, 1999，
effective Mar. 15, 1999), art. 5, § 1 (1999); see also art. 13 (amending Article 5 to 
include “The People's Republic of China governs the country according to law 
and makes it a socialist country under rule of law”). 
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the protection of their rights and interests.78  Facing such growing 
demands from the public, the administrative regime may be 
compelled to adopt more self-regulation in response.  
 
C. Pressure of Democratic Legitimacy 
 
Like many other countries, the legitimacy of public 
administration in China is also proclaimed to be founded on the 
basis of democracy.  In principle, the State Council is the executive 
arm of the NPC and its Standing Committee, while the local 
governments at various levels are the executive arms of the local 
congresses and their standing committees.79  However, the problem 
of a “loose transmission-belt”80 typical in Western countries is even 
more serious in China, because of which the public administration 
                                               
 78  For example, a questionnaire survey demonstrates that, compared 
with the low-income people, the higher-income people are more concerned with 
the constitutional protection of private property.  Almost 99% of the surveyed 
private sector owners hold with the opinion that the legitimate private property 
should get equal protection with the public property, and 81.3% of the people who 
show indifference to the constitutional article on the private property protection 
are at the low-income level.  Sun Changjun & Zhang Huihua, Siyou Caichan 
Baohu de Shehui Xinli Diaocha ji Xiangguan Yanjiu (私有财产保护的社会心理
调查及相关研究) [The Research and the Countermeasure about the Public 
Psychology in Protecting Private Property], 2 HENAN SIFA JINGGUAN ZHIYE 
XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. HENAN JUD. POLICE VOCATIONAL C.] 99, 101 (2005). 
 79  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (1982 Xiuzheng) (中华人民共
和国宪法(1982修正)) [Constitution of the People's Republic of China (1982 
Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People's Cong., Dec. 4, 1999), art. 85, 
105 (Article 85: “The State Council, that is, the Central People's Government, of 
the People's Republic of China is the executive body of the highest organ of state 
power; it is the highest organ of state administration;” Article 105: “Local 
people's governments at various levels are the executive bodies of local organs of 
state power as well as the local organs of state administration at the corresponding 
levels.  Governors, mayors and heads of counties, districts, townships and towns 
assume overall responsibility for local people's governments at various different 
levels”). 
 80  See Stewart, supra note 13 (discussing the loose legislative control of 
administrative discretion). 
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seems to lack a solid foundation of its legitimacy.81  Furthermore, 
representative democracy, although having undergone large changes 
in the past thirty years, still remains weak and subordinate to the 
dominance of the administration.  The administrative regime has a 
very powerful and influential position in the structure of 
government.  
However, at the same time, the administrative regime is also 
increasingly propelled by public opinion and forced to be more 
directly accountable to the people, while ideologies of democracy 
and the rule of law are slowly but irreversibly expanding.82  The 
growth of internet technology can help to shape public opinion 
                                               
 81  For example, most of the tax legislation in the past was not enacted by 
the National People’s Congress, but by the State Council.  Recently it has 
incurred more and more criticism from some deputies of the NPC as well as many 
scholars.  Hence the Law on Legislation was amended in 2015 by stating that “the 
establishment of any category of tax, determination of tax rates, tax collection 
administration, and other basic taxation rules” are the matters that shall only be 
governed by law except for the cases where laws have not yet been developed on 
the matters and the NPC or its Standing Committee delegate the legislating power 
to the State Council.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa (2015 Xiuzheng) (中
华人民共和国立法法(2015修正)) [The Law on Legislation of the People’s 
Republic of China (2015 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective Jul. 1, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015), art. 8(6).  
Furthermore, Ms. Fu Ying, the spokeswoman of the third plenary of the 12 NPC 
in 2015, released that it will be no later than the year of 2020 that the 
establishment of any new tax shall only be vested in the NPC or its Standing 
Committee.  Yinhong & Wang Haokui, 2020 Nianqian Quanmian Luoshi 
Shuishou Fading Yuanze (2020年前全面落实税收法定原则) [The Principle of 
Statutory Taxation Will Be Fully Implemented Before the Year of 2020], 
GUANGMING RIBAO [GUANGMING DAILY], Mar. 5, 2015. 
 82  The development of an administrative accountability system since 
2003, notwithstanding its limitations, is generally regarded as an attempt to 
realize some form of democracy in the current political context of China.  See, 
e.g., Lin Congjian & Zhou Yayue, Woguo Wanshan Xingzheng Wenze Zhizhi 
Lujing Fenxi (我国完善行政问责制止路径分析) [Analysis of the Path to 
Improve the Administrative Accountability in China], 3 NINGBO DAXUE XUEBAO 
(RENWEN KEXUE BAN) [J. NINGBO U. (LIBERAL ARTS)] 105, 105–11 (2006); Cao 
Liu, Cong Wenzhou Dongche Shigu Chuli Kan Woguo Xingzheng Wenzezhi de 
Fazhan (从温州动车事故处理看我国行政问责制的发展) [On the Development 
of China’s Administrative Accountability System By Observing the Treatment of 
Wenzhou Bullet Train Accident], 1 XINGZHENG FAXUE YANJIU [ADMIN. L. REV.] 
112, 112–17 (2012). 
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extremely rapidly, and voices criticizing the administration for 
breach of democracy or the rule of law can immediately pose huge 
pressures on both lower-level and superior officials.83  Both 
potential and actual pressure from the public has been forcing the 
administrative regime, particularly the State Council at the very top, 
to seek to bind administrators (both leaders and lower-level 
personnel) by self-regulation in order to decrease or eliminate their 
misconduct, corruption or other abuses of power, and further to 
strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the administrative regime.  
 
D. Structure of Bureaucracy 
 
Another important factor driving administrative self-
regulation is the bureaucratic structure of the administrative regime.  
One of the defining characteristics of such a hierarchical structure is 
that the superior commands the subordinate.84  And yet, in practice, 
                                               
 83 Hu Xue, Cong Wangluo Kongjuzheng Kan Wangluo Wenze dui 
Guanyuan de Yinxing Yingxiang (从网络恐惧症看网络问责对官员的隐性影响) 
[On the Invisible Influence of Administrative Accountability through Internet on 
the Officials by Observing the Cyberphobia], 5 LILUN GUANCHA [THEORETICAL 
OBSERVATION] 61, 61–62 (2009); Zhou Yayue & Han Zhiming, Gongmin 
Wangluo Wenze: Xingdong Luoji Yu Yaosu Fenxi (公民网络问责：行动逻辑与
要素分析) [Administrative Accountability through the Internet: An Analysis of the 
Logics of the Public Action and the Elements], 5 BEIJING HANGKONG HANGTIAN 
DAXUE XUEBAO (SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. OF BEIJING U. OF AERONAUTICS AND 
ASTRONAUTICS (SOC. SCI.)] 1, 1–5 (2011); Luo Yong, Wangluo Shidai Xia de 
Wangluo Wenze: Yizhong Xinxing Minzhu Xingtai de Kaoliang (网络時代下的网
络问责：一种新兴民主形态的考量) [Administrative Accountability through the 
Internet in the Internet Era: Examining a New Form of Democracy], 4 YUNNAN 
XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [J. YUNNAN ADMIN. C.] 64, 64–66 (2009). 
 84  MAX WEBER, JINGJI YU SHEHUI (经济与社会) [ECON. & SOC’Y] 246 
(Lin Rongyuan trans., Shangwu Yinshuguan (商务印书馆) [Commercial Press] 
1997) (1922); Ma Jianyin, Xiandai Fazhi Guanliao Zhiyu “Lixing Tielong”: Cong 
Weibo de Shehui Lilun Zhifa Chufa (现代法治官僚之余“理性铁笼”: 从微博
的社会理论执法处罚) [Modern Rule of Law, Bureaucracy and “Iron Cage of 
Rationality”: Starting from the Law Enforcement and Punishment under the 
Social Theory of Weber], 2 QINGHUA FAXUE [TSINGHUA L. REV.] 33, 41–42 
(2008); Huang Xiaoyong, Weibo Lixing Guanliaozhi Fanchou de Zairenshi (微博
理性官僚之范畴的再认识) [Rethinking of Weber’s Theory of Rational 
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the leadership at various levels of the government in China fear the 
severe public criticism that might arise from serious problems or 
scandals.85  Given this concern, administrative self-regulation has a 
two-fold function: (i) to restrict arbitrariness by administrative 
subordinates, and (ii) to share with or transfer accountability to 
these subordinates.  Besides, the engineering of advancing the 
administration by law, which is mostly initiated by the State 
                                                                                                           
Bureaucracy], 2 QINGHUA DAXUE XUEBAO (ZHEXUE SHEHUI KEXUE BAN) [J. 
TSINGHUA U. (PHIL. & SOC. SCI.)] 50, 51–52 (2002). 
 85 Such fear is reflected by the development of administrative 
accountability at the urging of the central government.  See Guanyu Shixing 
Dangzheng Lingdao Ganbu Wenze de Zanxing Guiding (关于实行党政领导干部
问责的暂行规定) [Interim Provisions on the Implementation of the 
Accountability System for the Leaders of the Party and Government] (issued by 
the Gen. Office of the Cent. Comm. of the Chinese Communist Party and the Gen. 
Office of the St. Council, Jun. 30, 2009, effective Jun. 30, 2009), art. 5 (2009): 
Under any of the following circumstances, a leader of the Party 
and government shall be held accountable: 
1. He/she makes serious faulty decisions, which leads to severe 
losses or adverse effects; 
2. He/she neglects his/her duties, which leads to the occurrence of 
an extremely serious accident, incident, or case, or successive 
occurrences of serious accidents, incidents, or cases in the region, 
department, system or entity where he/she worked during a 
relatively short period, causing severe losses or adverse effects; 
3. A functional department of a government has a poor 
administration and supervision, which leads to the occurrence of an 
extremely serious accident, incident, or case, or successive 
occurrences of serious accidents, incidents, or cases within the 
scope of its duties during a relatively short period, causing severe 
losses or adverse effects; 
4. He/she abuses power in administrative activities, forces or 
instructs others to conduct illegal administrative activities or has a 
nonfeasance, which causes a mass incident or other serious 
incidents; 
5. He/she improperly handles a mass or emergent incident, which 
worsens the situation and causes adverse effects; 
6. He/she violates the relevant provisions on selecting and 
appointing cadres, which leads to the evaluation failure or faulty 
use of personnel, causing adverse effects; or 
7. He/she conducts other neglect of duties, causing severe losses of 
national interests, human life and property, and public property, or 
causing adverse effects, etc. 
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Council, could be used by administrative superiors to better control 
their subordinates. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Due to the above dynamics, administrative self-regulation 
seems to be playing a positive role in advancing the rule of 
administrative law in China.  However, it is only one of the forces 
that might push forward the process, and it has its own inherent and 
formidable limitations.  Indeed, the dynamics of administrative self-
regulation are limited in terms of both steadiness and effectiveness.  
First, the State Council, the most important driver of 
administrative self-regulation, does not have sufficient time and 
resources to supervise the practical performance of self-regulation 
by the innumerable subordinate administrative agencies across the 
country.  Likewise, the “transmission belts” between the State 
Council, provincial governments, municipal governments, county 
governments and the town governments are loose.  It is still unclear 
whether the self-regulation provisions promulgated by local 
governments and their departments will nominally cater to the 
demands of superiors, or will actually be carried out and put into 
effect.  
Second, the pressure of public opinion that to some extent 
drives and supervises administrative self-regulation is mostly 
formed and represented through the media.  The space in which the 
media has to operate may be limited, and some illegal actions or 
decisions by the central or local governments may not be allowed to 
receive full reports and disclosure.  Separately, news reports may 
rapidly give rise to certain public opinion, but also may just as 
rapidly transfer attention to other subjects or topics, making it 
difficult to keep continuous pressure on the governments or their 
departments.  The pressure of public opinion is limited if it is very 
hard to transform it into systematic, steady and effective checks and 
balances by legislative or judicial bodies.  Hence, the contribution 
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of administrative self-regulation to the rule of administrative law in 
China must be observed, analyzed and recognized systematically 
and carefully.  Expectations might be placed on administrative self-
regulation for its contribution to the rule of administrative law in 
China; however, it is highly unlikely that the rule of administrative 
law can be achieved solely through administrative self-regulation.  
External regulation and its effectiveness are not only indispensable, 
but more important.  Otherwise, the final results of one-sided 
development of administrative self-regulation would be ubiquitous 
glass ceilings. 
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